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The Response of Term Rates to Monetary Policy Uncertainty∗
Abstract
This paper shows that greater uncertainty about monetary policy can lead to a decline in nom-
inal interest rates. In the context of a limited participation model, monetary policy uncertainty
is modeled as a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for the money growth process. This
increase in uncertainty lowers the yield on short-term maturity bonds because the household sec-
tor responds by increasing liquidity in the banking sector. Long-term maturity bonds also have
lower yields but this decrease is a result of the eﬀect that greater uncertainty has on the nominal
intertemporal rate of substitution — which is a convex function of money growth. These predictions
are broadly supported by the data: the conditional variance of monetary policy shocks identiﬁed
from a conventional monetary VAR negatively aﬀects the yields of federal funds, and the three and
six-month treasury bills.
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The current generation of quantitative macroeconomic models, such as those based on the
real business cycle paradigm, invariably cast the analysis within a stochastic environment in
which the ﬁrst moments of policy variables constitute the almost exclusive object of inter-
est. In this literature, beginning with the Lucas tradition that emphasized the distinction
between unanticipated and anticipated monetary policy and continuing with modern ex-
tensions that introduce various real and nominal rigidities (sticky prices, sticky wages, and
limited participation models, for example), there are few examples that study the impact
that the second (and higher) moments of policy variables have on economic activity and
welfare. This paper broadens the analysis of macroeconomic policy by investigating how
monetary policy uncertainty aﬀects one important aspect of the macroeconomy: nominal
yields on risk-free bonds.
We are not the ﬁrst to point out the paucity of research that examines the consequences
of policy uncertainty. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) highlight the scant attention that policy
uncertainty receives in open economy, macroeconomic policy analysis. While concerns about
uncertainty of monetary policy are reﬂected in popular discussions of policy transparency
and policy risk, the theoretical neglect of these issues is primarily driven by a key technical
consideration: the solution of stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic models typically
involves a linear approximation that implies certainty equivalence in equilibrium. Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ depart from certainty equivalence by assuming that the exogenous variables in the
model have lognormal distributions. This particular distributional assumption allows them
1to obtain closed form solutions. Our analysis also requires that we make distributional
assumptions to ﬁnd exact solutions to the economy but these take the form of a discrete-
state Markov process for monetary policy. Moreover, the transition probability matrix
of this Markov process is appropriately parametrized to study the eﬀects of time-varying
uncertainty.1
Few papers outside the ﬁnance literature have successfully explained the variation in
the term-structure of interest rates with a modern equilibrium macroeconomic model. For
example, den Haan’s (1995) analysis predicts a yield curve that is essentially ﬂat. A notable
exception is that of Evans and Marshall (1998) who ﬁnd that a limited participation model
of monetary nonneutrality is broadly consistent with empirical regularities in the term struc-
ture. A limited participation model2 is an attractive environment for an investigation of
policy uncertainty on term-structure relations because of three important properties: (1)
the channel of monetary policy transmission is captured through the traditional mechanism
of liquidity aﬀecting interest rates which, in turn, aﬀect real activity; (2) agent’s savings de-
cisions, which in part determine the supply of funds in the loan market, are made before the
state of the world is known. Consequently, time varying uncertainty in monetary policy may
create an endogenous response in the loan market which will be reﬂected in interest rates;
and (3) nominal interest rates are aﬀected by both Fisherian and liquidity factors. Subse-
1 That is, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) focus on the unconditional variance of money growth so that their
analysis is one of comparative dynamics. In contrast, the analysis presented here studies the eﬀects of
changes in uncertainty within a particular economy.
2 This monetary model is also a departure from the Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) analysis which generates
a demand for money by placing real balances in the utility function. Since their focus is on price setting
behavior and nominal rigidities, a money-in-the-utility fuction approach is reasonable. However, since our
emphasis is on the term structure, a richer model of interest rates is required.
2quently, changes in the second moment of monetary policy (which in our model is described
by a simple money growth rule) may aﬀect interest rates through one or both factors. The
few previous studies that have examined the eﬀects of time-varying uncertainty (e.g. Lee,
1995; Hodrick, 1989; and Dellas and Salyer, 2001) used a simple cash-in-advance framework
so that nominal interest rates are not aﬀected by liquidity considerations. In addition, the
environments investigated in these papers were either exchange economies or they insulated
production from monetary uncertainty so that the interaction between uncertainty, output,
and interest rates could not be analyzed.
The main results in our paper can be summarized as follows. The model predicts that
increases in monetary policy uncertainty will produce a generalized decline in interest rates
for all maturities. This prediction has diﬀerent explanations that depend on the maturity of
the bond: at the very short end of the maturity spectrum, the endogenous response of savings
(i.e. funds placed in the banking sector) to greater uncertainty results in more liquidity in
the lending market, thus lowering the nominal yield. At longer maturities, the decline in
rates because of greater uncertainty is due to the fact that the marginal utility of a dollar
is a convex function of money growth, which causes a fall in the certainty equivalence of a
dollar in the future. The predictions for term premia are indeterminate since they depend
on risk aversion and the persistence of monetary policy.
The empirical results support these predictions. We use Evans and Marshall’s (1998)
monetary VAR to identify the monetary policy innovation series which is then ﬁtted with a
GARCH(1,1) process to characterize its time-varying volatility. The dynamic responses of
3nominal interest rates to variations in this time-varying volatility are negative, just as the
model predicts. The lack of an appreciable eﬀect of uncertainty on term premia is consistent
with the high degree of inertia in monetary policy setting. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, whose solution is described in Section
3. Section 4 measures the eﬀect of monetary policy uncertainty empirically and Section 5
presents our conclusions.
2T h e M o d e l
The model that we employ for our analysis is closely related to that presented in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997), hence, expositional comments will be brief. The setup is
a standard limited participation framework with four sectors; ﬁrms, households, ﬁnancial
intermediaries and the monetary authority. Moreover, the interaction between these sectors
is characterized by three factors: (1) households determine the fraction of savings placed in
the banking sector before they know the current monetary growth rate state; (2) ﬁrms must
borrow funds to pay their labor costs; and (3) the monetary transfer is distributed solely to
the ﬁnancial intermediaries. The details and implications of this environment are provided
below.
2.1 Firms





4For expositional simplicity and to concentrate on the liquidity channel, note that we have
assumed that capital is ﬁxed at the value of one in all periods.3 Consequently, ﬁrms
purchase labor from households with the nominal wage given by Wt. Firms must pay
for labor services in advance of production with the wage bill ﬁnanced via loans from the
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Therefore, the cost of production is given by RtWtht, where Rt is
the (gross) interest rate on loans from the banking sector, which are repaid at the end of the







As can be clearly seen in equation (2), nominal interest rates will aﬀect labor costs and,
therefore, can inﬂuence economic activity.
2.2 Households
Households decisions are more complicated and are made sequentially as information be-
comes available. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that agents must allocate their nominal wealth
at the beginning of the period between funds to be used for consumption (denoted ct)i nt h e
goods market (where agents face a cash-in-advance constraint) and savings, It,p l a c e di nt h e
banking sector. This portfolio decision is made before the current state of the world, i.e. the
monetary growth rate state, is known. After the funds are allocated to the banking sector,
agents learn of the monetary growth rate state and, with this resolution of uncertainty, all
prices are known. Consumption and labor decisions are then made. Note that the funds
3 The capital stock is owned by the households; hence ﬁrm proﬁts represent the returns to capital. These
are distributed to households at the end of the period.
5allocated for consumption at the beginning of the period are augmented by current labor
income; this total is used to ﬁnance consumption (the cash-in-advance constraint is binding).
Households then receive proﬁts from ﬁrms (denoted ζt), the income from deposits made to
the banking sector, and bank proﬁts made from lending new money, Tt, received from the
monetary authorities (described in detail below).




















    
(3)
subject to:
Ptct ≤ Mt−1 − It + Wtht (4)
Mt =( Mt−1 − It + Wtht − Ptct)+ζt + Rt(Tt + It) (5)
The time subscripts on the expectations operators are used to denote the information
set relevant at the time of decision. Equation (4) is the cash-in-advance constraint while
















where Uc,t and Ul,t denote the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, respectively.
Equation (6) is the hallmark of the limited participation model and represents the fact that
6the one-period nominal interest rate will be, on average, equal to the nominal intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution. However, Rt will depart from this term due to unanticipated
changes in liquidity. Consequently, the short term nominal interest rate is aﬀected by
Fisherian (i.e. the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution) and liquidity factors. The
second equation represents the traditional labor-leisure trade-oﬀ.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Each period, ﬁnancial intermediaries in the economy issue loans, Lt, in order to maximize
proﬁts. It is assumed that there are no costs associated with making loans so that all funds
are inelastically supplied. That is,
Lt = Tt + It (8)
As noted before, Tt denotes the monetary transfer from the central bank. The assumption
that the monetary injection enters into the economy via the banking sector is another distin-
guishing characteristic of the limited participation model and is an attempt to capture the
asymmetric eﬀects that open market operations have on households and ﬁnancial interme-
diaries. All proﬁts, i.e. Rt(Tt + It), made from lending activity are returned to households
at the end of the period.
2.4 The monetary authority
The sole purpose of the central bank is to provide money to the economy. Rather than
explicitly modeling monetary policy, we assume that the money supply grows exogenously
7at the rate, gt. That is, the evolution of the money supply, ¯ Mt,i sg i v e nb y :
¯ Mt = ¯ Mt−1(1 + gt) (9)
We assume that the growth rate follows a discrete state Markov process. The parameters
of this process are chosen to facilitate the study of time-varying uncertainty.4 Speciﬁcally,
gt will follow a four-state Markov process with possible realizations,
gt =

          
          
g1 =¯ g − δ
g2 =¯ g
g3 =¯ g
g4 =¯ g + δ
(10)
Note that since the realization of the monetary growth rate is identical in states 2 and 3,
the monetary growth rate state is not determined solely by the value of gt.H e n c e , w e w i l l











































The limiting or unconditional distribution of this process (given by the eigenvector of Π
associated with the eigenvalue of 1) is uniform, i.e. the unconditional probability of state i is
pi =1 /4. I ti so b v i o u sf r o me q u a t i o n(10) that this implies that the unconditional ﬁrst and
4 This Markov process was used previously by Salyer and Slotsve (1993) to study the eﬀects that time-
varying uncertainty of technology shocks have on equity prices and interest rates.
8second moments of money growth are, E (gt)=¯ g and Va r(gt)=δ
2/2. Also, the ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation of money growth is given by Corr(gt,g t−1)=( 4 π − 1)/3. Hence, whether
π (>,=,<)1 /4 implies whether Corr(gt,g t−1)( >,=,<)0 .
While the unconditional probabilities are necessary for characterizing the stationary dis-
tribution of the equilibrium in the economy, it is the conditional distribution of money growth
that determines equilibrium behavior. In particular, as can be seen in equation (6), changes
in the ﬁrst and second moments of money growth will aﬀect the conditional expectations
that determine investment decisions (i.e. funds deposited in the banking sector) and nominal
interest rates. The ﬁrst and second moments conditional on the state, st, at time t, are
easily characterized by,
si E (gt+1|st = si) Va r(gt+1|st = si)




9 (1 + 7π +8 π2)δ
2
2¯ g 2
3 (1 − π)δ
2
3¯ g (1 − π)δ
2




9 (1 + 7π +8 π2)δ
2
Consequently, the eﬀects of the ﬁrst moments of money growth on equilibrium can be
studied by comparing the equilibrium properties between states s1 and s4. However, more
important for our purposes, equilibrium behavior between states s2 and s3 reﬂects the impact
of changes in the second moment of money growth since the conditional distribution in state
s3 represents a mean-preserving spread in the distribution relative to that in state s2.S i n c e
our interest lies in studying the eﬀects of time varying uncertainty of monetary policy, we
9will focus exclusively on equilibrium in these two states.
3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the economy is characterized by the sequence of consumption, labor, and
interest rates that satisfy the necessary conditions given in the previous section and are




Equilibrium in the lending market, the assumption that the cash-in-advance constraint is
binding, and the equilibrium condition Mt = ¯ Mt imply
Tt + It = Lt = Wtht (13)
Ptct = Mt−1 + Wtht − It = Mt−1 + Tt = Mt−1(1 + gt)=Mt (14)
To compute equilibrium, the following functional form for preferences is used:5





+ A(1 − ht)













5 These preferences are a departure from that studied in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997).
They use preferences that are logarithmic in a composite good represented as a non-linear function of
consumption and leisure. Their functional form highlights agents’ labor supply elasticity. Since our interest
is in time-varying changes in risk, we impose constant relative risk aversion on consumption so that we can
examine the eﬀects of risk aversion on equilibrium behavior.















Due to the sequential revelation of information, consumption, labor and interest rates
will, in a stationary equilibrium, be a function of both the current and the previous realization
of the monetary growth rate. The investment decision, in contrast, will only be a function
of the monetary growth rate at time t − 1 since this determines the relevant information
set. We deﬁne a stationary monetary equilibrium in terms of the beginning of period money
stock, Mt−1. That is, the investment decision is written as:




where i =1 ,2,3,4 denotes the state (i.e. the realization of the monetary growth rate state)
in period t − 1.













where j =1 ,2,3,4 denotes the state of the monetary growth rate state at time t.U s i n g
the labor-leisure necessary condition in the left hand side of equation (15) and given the
production function in (1), the left-hand side term can be written as:
Ac
γ−1
ij hij = Ah
γ(1−α)+α
ij







; i,j =1 ,2,3,4 (19)
By using the cash-in-advance constraint and the production function, the intertemporal


















where k =1 ,2,3,4 is used to denote the state in period t +1 . Equation (20) implies an
additional 4 equations that must be satisﬁed in equilibrium.








Equilibrium is thus characterized by the 36 values (hij,R ij,ii) that solve the 36 equations
represented by expressions (19),(20), and (21).
To explore the implications that time-varying monetary uncertainty has on interest rates,
we introduce three other bonds into this economy - a one period real bond (denominated in







. These bonds trade in an asset market that is assumed to open






is diﬀerentiated from Rt (the one-period yield on funds placed in the
banking sector) because all uncertainty about liquidity has been resolved. By comparing
12the equilibrium behavior of these one-period yields, the eﬀects of liquidity and uncertainty
can be studied. The pricing formulas for the three bonds are determined by the associated
necessary conditions:




























Finally, we compute the holding premia to study the implications for term premia, i.e.,
the diﬀerence between the expected return from selling a two-period bond after one-period
and the current one-period yield. Since there are two one-period yields in this economy,






















We now describe the equilibrium behavior of these yields and yield diﬀerentials.
3.1 Characterizing Equilibrium
In order to study the equilibrium characteristics of the economy, the parameter values de-
scribing tastes (β,γ,A), technology (α) and monetary policy (π,¯ g,δ) must be speciﬁed.
The parameter values were calibrated to produce reasonable outcomes that would highlight
the qualitative characteristics of equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, agents’ discount factor was set
to β =0 .95 while the elasticity of output with respect to labor was held constant at 64%
13(α =0 .36). In addition, the unconditional mean and standard deviation of monetary growth
were set at E (gt)=¯ g =0 .04;a n d
√
2(σg)=δ =0 .12. These parameter values imply that
the steady-state (i.e. no uncertainty) nominal interest rate is roughly 9%.
We conducted four experiments that diﬀered by the degree of persistence in money growth
and by the degree of relative risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, we computed the equilibrium for
π =0 .25,0.81 which, given the Markov process speciﬁed in (11), implies that Corr(gt,g t+1)=
0,0.75. T h er i s ka v e r s i o np a r a m e t e rt a k e so nt h ev a l u e sγ =1 ,5. Finally, the parameter A
was adjusted so that, for all experiments, 40% of time was spent in work activity in steady-
state.
Before examining the eﬀects of time-varying uncertainty in the monetary growth rate, it
is important to ﬁrst note that equilibrium is indeed inﬂuenced by changes in liquidity. This
c a nb es e e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 9 )i nw h i c ht h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o ni nb o t h
ii and gj;g i v e nt h a tα<1, this implies that labor will be positively related to both terms.














Consequently, greater liquidity will cause the short-term nominal interest rate to fall.
The eﬀects of time-varying uncertainty in money growth are now examined in the four
economies by comparing equilibrium values in states s2 and s3. Since equilibrium interest
rates and labor are determined by both the current and previous monetary growth rate
states, we assume that these states are constant. That is, the low uncertainty state is
represented by the values
 




while the eﬀects of greater uncertainty
14of future money growth is reﬂected in the values
 





are reported in Tables 1a and Table 1b.
Consider ﬁrst the case where there is no serial correlation in money growth, i.e., π =0 .25.
Note that increases in uncertainty (corresponding to st = s3)r e s u l ti na ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
amount of funds placed in the banking sector. This increase in liquidity results in a fall in
the short-term nominal interest (i.e. R33 <R 22) which, in turn, produces a (small) increase
in labor. While relative risk aversion aﬀects the level of interest rates, it does not aﬀect the
qualitative eﬀects of uncertainty.
Like the short-term interest rate, all other yields (both nominal and real) fall with in-
creases in uncertainty. This eﬀect, however, is not due to increased liquidity but is due to
the fact that both the agent’s marginal utility and the inverse of the inﬂation rate (which
determines the real return on nominal bonds) are convex functions. A mean preserving
spread in the distribution causes the expected value of these functions to increase which
results in lower yields.
The intuition behind these results is clear. Consider the real interest rate, ρt.G r e a t e r
uncertainty of future consumption lowers the certainty equivalent level of next period’s
consumption implying an increase in the relative amount of current consumption. The
price of current consumption relative to future consumption, the real interest rate, therefore
falls. Again, relative risk aversion does not aﬀect this qualitative response. With serial
correlation in money growth, these qualitative eﬀects are still present but are smaller in
magnitude.
15Turning to the predictions for the term premia, note that the term premium deﬁned in
terms of Rt (i.e. TPt) always increases with greater uncertainty. However, the term premium
TPI
t does not exhibit such monotonic behavior — with low risk aversion, this term premium
stays relatively constant when there is no serial correlation in the growth rate (namely
π =0 .25) or falls when the money growth rate is serially correlated (π =0 .81). However,
with high risk aversion, the relationship is reversed: this term premium increases when money
growth is serially uncorrelated (and also when uncertainty increases) but remains relatively
constant when money growth is serially correlated, irrespective of the level of uncertainty.
These results can be summarized as follows: greater monetary uncertainty leads to
lower interest rates. The eﬀect on the term premia depends on whether the short term
interest rate is aﬀected primarily by liquidity or expected inﬂation. If liquidity factors
are dominant (TP t), then the term premia should increase with greater uncertainty. If
inﬂationary expectations are the primary factor aﬀecting nominal interest rates, then the
model’s predictions are less clear: greater uncertainty should lower term premia if agents
have low risk aversion; if risk aversion is high, term premia should increase instead.
4 Measuring the Response of Interest Rates to Uncer-
tainty
Perhaps the most common tool of empirical analysis in the monetary economist’s belt is the
vector autoregression (VAR). Albeit not without controversy, VARs are commonly used to
identify monetary policy shocks and to investigate the dynamic response of macro-variables
to a monetary impulse. In a related paper, Evans and Marshall (1998) analyze how these
16monetary impulses aﬀect the shape of the yield curve for nominally risk-free bonds. In
particular, they ﬁnd that a contractionary shock causes a substantial increase in short-
term nominal yields, with a progressively smaller response as the maturity of the bond
is lengthened. This in turn ﬂattens the slope and the curvature of the yield curve. These
observations are broadly consistent with the predictions of a limited participation model that
is closely related to the model presented in Section 2. Although we investigate a diﬀerent
eﬀect — that of time-varying uncertainty in monetary policy on risk-free interest rates and
term premia — it will be advantageous to examine these issues with an empirical framework
similar to that in Evans and Marshall (1998). In addition, the speciﬁcation in Evans and
Marshall (1998), originally proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), has been
used in other contexts as well (e.g. see Hamilton and Jordá, 2000; and Hoover and Jordá,
2001).
The overall empirical strategy that we pursue consists of identifying a monetary shock
series based on Evans and Marshall’s (1998) monetary VAR. These orthogonalized innova-
tions allow us to then construct a series for the conditional standard deviation based on a
GARCH (1,1) process. We will interpret this conditional standard deviation as a measure
of time-varying uncertainty in monetary policy. Finally, in order to investigate the eﬀects
that monetary uncertainty has on the yields and term premia of short-term risk-free bonds,
we investigate the dynamic response of the federal funds, the three-month T-Bill and the
six-month T-Bill rates to variations in time-varying uncertainty measured by the GARCH
(1,1) conditional standard deviation. We present the details of this empirical strategy below.
174.1 Identifying Policy Shocks
The ﬁrst stepof the empirical analysis requires that we compute a measure of monetary policy
uncertainty. A reasonable indicator of this uncertainty measure can be constructed from the
conditional variance of the orthogonalized innovation to the monetary policy indicator. In
particular, consider a version of Evans and Marshall’s (1998) monetary VAR, which consists
of a six variable system that contains the following variables: the logarithm of nonagricultural
employment, EM; the logarithm of personal consumption expenditures deﬂator (1996 =
100), P; the annual growth rate of the index of sensitive commodities price index, PCOM;
the federal funds rate, FF; the ratio of nonborrowed reserves plus extended credit to total
reserves, NBRX; and the annual growth rate of M2, ∆M2. Given this six variable system,
Evans and Marshall (1998) follow much of the literature in taking FF as the monetary
policy indicator.6 Therefore, we can interpret the equation for FF as a reduced form for
the policy reaction function.
Identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock from the policy reaction function further
requires that we make an assumption that renders the residuals of the six variable VAR
orthogonal to each other in a manner that also delivers a structural interpretation of such
shocks. The standard assumption in the literature is to assume a Wold causal order and use
the Cholesky decomposition to obtain the appropriate orthogonalization. The ordering used
in Evans and Marshall (1998) is EMt,P t,PCOM t,FF t,NBRX t,∆M2t. In addition, Evans
and Marshall (1998) experiment with two alternative identiﬁcation schemes: a nonrecursive
6 The VAR literature contains numerous speciﬁcations in which the federal funds rate is chosen as the
monetary policy indicator. For an extensive survey see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
18identiﬁcation strategy due to Sims and Zha (1998), and an identiﬁcation strategy based on
long-run restrictions due to Gali (1992). Each of these variants does not deliver signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent responses to the orthogonalized monetary shock and thus, for the sake of brevity,
will not be explored here.
The VAR is estimated with monthly data for the period 1965:1 to 1999:4 and contains
twelve lags. This speciﬁcation replicates that in Evans and Marshall (1998) except that it
expands the sample with 40 additional observations. Figure 1 displays the responses of the
variables in the system to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock (i.e., a shock
to the federal funds rate equation), along with Monte-Carlo, two standard-deviation, error
bands. The responses displayed in Figure 1 correspond rather closely to those reported in
Figure 1, page 59 in Evans and Marshall (1998): a contractionary shock in FF induces a
signiﬁcant decline in employment and prices. The response of NBRX is consistent with
a liquidity eﬀect and the negative response of ∆M2 is consistent with the contraction of
money demand. Altogether, these are conventional results in the monetary literature (see
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999).
4.2 Measuring Policy Uncertainty
A natural estimate of policy uncertainty can be obtained from the conditional variance
of the orthogonalized monetary policy shocks. In the parlance of the VAR literature, these
residuals represent that component of monetary policy that is unexpected by rational agents.
It is therefore logical to interpret the variance of these residuals as a measure of policy
uncertainty: in the limit, if the central bank were to follow a publicly announced policy rule
19precisely, there would not be any policy uncertainty and therefore, this variance would be
zero. Consequently, we will collect the series of orthogonalized monetary innovations and
we will ﬁt a GARCH(1,1) model in order to compute the conditional variance series. More
speciﬁcally, let ε
ff


















with log-likelihood, L = −155.611 and standard errors in parenthesis. Note that the sum
of the coeﬃcients in the GARCH terms is 0.988, suggesting a nearly integrated process.
Clues that justify this high level of persistence can be obtained by graphing the conditional
standard deviation series,   σt, which can be easily constructed from the estimates in (27) and
is displayed in Figure 2. We have divided the display into three parts corresponding to the
chairmanships of Arthur Burns and William Miller (the pre-Volcker period); Paul Volcker
(Volcker period) and Alan Greenspan (Greenspan period). Perhaps the most signiﬁcant
event in the graph is the dramatic increase in volatility that coincided with Volcker’s ﬁrst
few months in oﬃce and the nonborrowed reserves targeting experiment during which the
federal funds rate was allowed to ﬂuctuate. Outside of this period of unusual volatility,
there is a substantial decline (close to one-third in size) in volatility between the pre-Volcker
period and Greenspan’s chairmanship.
These results are broadly consistent with the evolution of monetary operating procedures
and the relative transparency with which Fed policy has been communicated to the public.
20Thus, while “Temporary operations were scrutinized [by Fed watchers] to determine whether
the Desk7 might be signaling a change in the stance of monetary policy ... Beginning in the
late 1980’s, as the FOMC8 gave increasing weight to the behavior of the federal funds rate in
setting policy, reading the stance of policy became easier as it was over most of the preceding
decade” (Meulendyke, 1998, page 204). Furthermore, “In 1994, when the FOMC began to
issue press releases announcing policy changes almost immediately after the decisions were
made, Fed watchers no longer needed to provide analysis of daily Desk activity to interpret
current FOMC policy,” (Meulendyke, 1998, page 204).
Very broadly speaking, one could summarize these three periods in terms of operating
targets and transparency. The pre-Volcker years are essentially characterized by federal funds
rate targeting, an operating procedure that also deﬁnes the Greenspan years. The main
diﬀerence between these two periods is perhaps the 1994 policy experiment of announcing
the target publicly, a policy that possibly accounts for the observed decline in volatility
between these two periods. By contrast, the Volcker years began with the nonborrowed
reserves targeting experiment which was designed to unburden the Fed from the political
weight of drastically increasing short-term rates to ﬁght oﬀ inﬂation. Consequently, it is
perhaps not surprising that this period is characterized by the highest level of volatility, in
line with the desire to maintain a high level of obfuscation.
7 “Desk” refers to the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Desk is in charge of
conducting open market operations in a manner consistent with monetary policy objectives.
8 FOMC stands for Federal Open Market Committee, and is the decision body at the Federal Reserve
comissioned with setting monetary policy.
214.3 Term-Structure Responses to Monetary Policy Volatility
Ultimately, the goal of this section is to determine whether time-varying uncertainty of mon-
etary policy negatively aﬀects term rates in accordance with the predictions of the model
presented in Section 2. The previous two subsections have permitted us to construct a mea-
sure of this time-varying uncertainty based on the orthogonalized shocks of a conventional
monetary VAR and a traditional GARCH(1,1) model. This measure of uncertainty matches
well with the historical evolution of the operating procedures at the Federal Reserve. There-
fore, it seems natural to investigate the dynamic response of term rates to time varying
uncertainty by combining this measure,   σt, with data on term rates in a vector linear dy-
namic system such as a VAR. More speciﬁcally, consider a system that includes   σt along with
the federal funds rate, FF; the three-month T-Bill rate, TB3; and the six-month T-Bill rate,
TB6. The federal funds rate and the three-month T-Bill rate are the natural counterparts of
the Rt and RI
t short-term rates presented in Section 2, while the six-month T-Bill rate can
be seen as a two period bond rate relative to the three-month T-Bill rate and would most
closely relate to the rate RII
t .
Let Zt =(   σt,FF t,TB3t,TB6t)  and consider a VAR for Zt where the shocks are orthog-
onalized with a Cholesky decomposition based on the same ordering in which the variables
in Zt are reported. This VAR will be estimated with 12 lags of monthly data over the same
sample (1965:1 - 1999:4) over which we estimated the VAR in Subsection 4.1. The choice
of structural identiﬁcation is natural given the nature of term-structure relations between
rates of increasing maturity. The impulse response function of term rates to orthogonalized
22shocks in the   σt equation will allow us to examine the eﬀect of time-varying uncertainty on
interest rates.
Additionally, we can use the model to analyze the eﬀect of time-varying uncertainty on
term premia. In particular, the term premium between the federal funds rate and either the
three-month T-Bill rate or the six-month T-Bill rate can be expressed as follows:
TP
j





EtFF t+i j =3 ,6; (28)
Notice that the dynamic response of TP
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Z t−1 denotes (Zt−1,Z t−2,...). From (28), it is easy to see that,
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and similarly for E(TP
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t+s|  σt =
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Z t−1). Noticing that




Z t−1) − E(zjt+s|;
← →
Z t−1) zjt,z ht ∈ Zt (31)
is the usual deﬁnition of the impulse response function of zj to a shock in zh, the dynamic
response of the term premium deﬁned in (29) can be easily computed as the diﬀerence
between the contemporaneous response of TBj t for j =3or 6, and the average of the ﬁrst
j − step responses of FF t.
Figure 3 displays graphs for the responses of each rate along with Monte-Carlo, two
standard-deviation, error bands, as well as the responses of the term premia for the three
23and six month T-Bill rates. All of these responses are in reference to a shock in   σt of size
0.055 (remember that average volatility over the pre-Volcker, Volcker, and Greenspan periods
is 0.37, 0.60, and 0.26 respectively). The results displayed in Figure 3 are consistent with
the predictions in Section 2. In response to an increase in uncertainty of 0.055 , all three
rates signiﬁcantly decline over the following 4 months by approximately 15 basis points. The
response of the term premia ﬂuctuates around 0 and therefore, do not provide discriminating
information as to whether liquidity factors or inﬂation expectations are the dominant factors.
However, this result is consistent with the predictions in Section 3: recall that in our model,
high persistence in the money growth rule keeps the term premium unresponsive. Thus,
the observed unresponsiveness in term premia is consistent with the substantial monetary
policy inertia that characterizes the data and which has been previously investigated in the
literature (e.g. see Woodford 1999, or Sack and Wieland 2000).
5C o n c l u s i o n
Limited participation models are perhaps the only class of dynamic equilibrium models of
monetary economies whose predictions of term structure relations match the data reason-
ably well. Because they are capable of generating a signiﬁcant liquidity eﬀect, these models
are particularly well suited to investigate the transmission of monetary policy on the term
structure. The modeling tradition that characterizes these models (as well as most dynamic
equilibrium models) essentially devotes undivided attention to the analysis of relations based
on ﬁrst moments of the stochastic processes that characterize the behavior of policy vari-
24ables. As we discuss, this restrictive analysis is largely motivated by the technical diﬃculties
entailed in solving these models rather than by an intrinsic disinterest in higher moment
eﬀects.
The contribution of this paper is to open new ground in this modeling tradition by
exploring the eﬀects of a particularly relevant second moment eﬀect: that of time-varying
monetary policy uncertainty on term rates. Contrary to cursory intuition, we show that term
rates tend to decline when monetary policy becomes more uncertain. At the short-end, this
increase in uncertainty results in increased liquidity in the lending market whereas at the
long-end, the convexity of consumption to money growth modiﬁes the certainty equivalence
of a dollar in the future.
The predictions of the model are well supported by the data. An initial, moderate
increase in the volatility of monetary policy can cause a generalized drop in interest rates of
approximately 15 basis points over the ﬁrst four months after impact. Over time, however,
this eﬀect is reversed within the span of 12 months. Term premia do not appear to respond
to this increase in volatility, a result that corresponds well with the predictions of our model
and the observation that monetary policy has substantial inertia.
25Table 1a — The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy Uncertainty in a Limited
Participation Model
Low Relative Risk Aversion: γ =1









it−1 58.0 58.4 57.3 57.5
ht|t−1 40.8 41.1 40.4 40.5
Rt|t−1 − 1 7.3 6.7 8.5 8.1
RI
t|t−1 − 1 8.7 8.4 9.3 9.2
RII
t|t−1 − 1 8.7 8.5 9.1 9.0
ρt|t−1 − 1 4.8 4.5 5.1 5.1
TP t|t−1 2.3 2.9 1.1 1.6
TPI
t|t−1 00 -0.10 -0.20
Note: all variables expressed in percentages
26Table 1b — The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy Uncertainty in a Limited
Participation Model
High Relative Risk Aversion: γ =5









it−1 58.0 58.4 57.1 57.3
ht|t−1 40.2 40.3 40.0 40.1
Rt|t−1 − 1 7.3 6.6 8.8 8.5
RI
t|t−1 − 1 7.8 7.0 9.0 8.8
RII
t|t−1 − 1 8.2 7.8 9.1 8.9
ρt|t−1 − 1 4.5 4.2 5.1 5.0
TP t|t−1 1.3 1.6 0.50 0.70
TPI
t|t−1 0.50 0.80 0.10 0.10
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Figure 3 - Response of Term Rates and Term Premia to a 0.055 Shock
in the Conditional Standard Deviation of the Monetary Policy Innovation
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate ± 2 S.E. Monte-Carlo Standard ErrorsReferences
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans (1996) “Identiﬁcation
and the Eﬀects of Monetary-Policy Shocks,” in Financial Factors in Economic Stabi-
lization and Growth, (eds.) M. Blejer, Z. Eckstein, Z. Hercowitz, and L. Leiderman.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans (1997) “Sticky Price
and Limited Participation Models of Money: A Comparison,” European Economic
Review, 41, 1201-1249.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans (1999) “Monetary
Policy Shocks: What Have we Learned and to What End?” in Handbook of Macro-
economics, vol. 1A, (eds.) John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Dellas, Harris and Kevin D. Salyer (2001) “Some Fiscal Implications of Monetary
Policy,” Bulletin of Economic Research, forthcoming.
den Haan, Wouter (1995) “The Term Structure of Interest Rates in Real and Monetary
Economics,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19, 909-940.
Evans, Charles L. and David A. Marshall (1998) “Monetary Policy and the Term Struc-
ture of Nominal Interest Rates: Evidence and Theory,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 49, 53-111.
Gali, Jordi (1992) “How Well Does the IS-LM Model Fit Post War Data?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 107, 709-738.
Hamilton, James D. and Oscar Jordá (2000) “A Model for the Federal Funds Rate
Target,” NBER Working Paper 7847.
Hodrick, Robert J. (1989) “Risk, Uncertainty, and Exchange Rates,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 23, 433-460.
Hoover, Kevin D. and Oscar Jordá (2001) “Measuring Systematic Monetary Policy,”
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, forthcoming.
Lee, Sang-Sub (1995) “Macroeconomic Sources of Time-Varying Risk Premia in the
Term Structure of Interest Rates,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 27, 549-
569.
Meulendyke, Ann-Marie (1998) U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
31Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoﬀ (2000) “New Directions for Stochastic Open
Economy Models,” Journal of International Economics, 50, 117-153.
Sack, Brian and Volcker Wieland (2000) “Interest-Rate Smoothing and Optimal Mon-
etary Policy: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Economics and
Business, 52(1—2), 205-228.
Salyer, Kevin D. and George Slotsve (1993) “Time-Varying Technological Uncertainty
and Asset Prices,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, 392-416.
Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha (1998) “Does Monetary Policy Generate Reces-
sions?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper, 98-12.
Woodford, Michael (1999) “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia,” Manchester School,
67(0) Supplement, 1-35.
32